2026 - 2027
2026 - 2027
buckle up!
buckle up!
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Act 1: Silver Crash 1979-1980
Hunt Brothers
In 1980, the Hunt brothers' attempt to corner the silver market pushed prices from $6 to $7 per ounce in the late 1970s to over $50 per ounce.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) raised the margin requirements on silver futures contracts, which forced the Hunt brothers to liquidate their positions to meet the increased financial demands.
Silver prices plummeted to around $10 per ounce, resulting in approximately $1 billion in losses.
Ultimately, the Hunts declared bankruptcy and faced a $134 million fine for market manipulation, unable to repay their debts.
In 1960, their younger brother, Lamar Hunt, founded the Kansas City Chiefs.
Who drove demand Physical tightness + inflation + concentrated longs
Who drove demand Speculative concentration + public participation
Dominant buyer funding source Leverage (futures, margin, broker credit)
Primary system constraint Exchange rule integrity
Paper-market response Margin hikes; participation constraints
Physical-market response Availability tightened sharply
Geographic price leadership USA-only COMEX
Release valve Administrative intervention
Primary silver–gold repricing phase (speed & duration)
~4–6 weeks; vertical, disorderly repricing (late 1979 → Jan 1980)
Authority exit mechanism (how it ends) Administrative suppression of demand (rules override price until positions unwind)
London Bullion Market Association involvement ❌ No
Shanghai Metals Exchange involvement ❌ No
China legislation barring silver exports ❌ No
USA law declaring silver critical ❌ No
U.S. Mint status (retail silver coins) ❌ No
No closure; coin supply available
Pre-crisis Silver:Gold ratio ≈ 1 : 35–40
Post-crisis Silver:Gold ratio ≈ 1 : 15–20 (1980 stabilization band)
India law: Silver as bank loan collateral ❌ No
10:1 Silver to Gold
Multinational corporations contracting directly with mines ❌ No
Debt/GDP pre-crisis (U.S.) Nov 1979: ≈ $0.83 T ≈ 30–33 %
Paper-market stabilization note ❌ Not available
Key similarity Paper control failed when delivery mattered
Key difference
Easier to stop (few actors, single jurisdiction)
Act II — now
Act II — now
2026 - 2027 Silver market
2026 - 2027 Silver market
Stress Type
Physical tightness + strategic industrial demand + government accumulation + monetary stress
Who drove demand
Structural demand (industrials, governments, households)
Dominant buyer funding source
Balance sheets (cash buyers, sovereigns, long-term off-take)
Primary system constraint
Physical availability + national allocation
Paper-market response
Margin pressure; settlement incentives; rule discretion
Physical-market response
Availability tight; premiums + off-exchange contracting;
Shanghai (CHINA) prices ~$10–$15 above COMEX (USA)
Geographic price leadership
USA, London, Shanghai (contested price leadership)
Release valve
Price rationing / benchmark authority shift
Primary silver–gold repricing phase (speed & duration)
? (unknown ex-ante)
Authority exit mechanism (how it ends)
? (unknown ex-ante)
London Bullion Market Association
✅ Yes (indirect — reference pricing, warehousing signals, rule precedent)
Shanghai Metals Exchange involvement
✅ Yes (physical clearing, premiums, alternative price authority)
China legislation barring silver exports
✅ Yes
USA law declaring silver critical
U.S. Mint status (retail silver coins) ✅ Yes
Temporarily closed / no silver coins for sale
Signaling retail-level physical exhaustion
Pre-crisis Silver:Gold ratio
≈ 1 : 52 (Jan 2026 baseline)
Post-crisis Silver:Gold ratio
? (unknown ex-ante)
India law: Silver as bank loan collateral ✅ Yes
10:1 Silver to Gold
Multinational corporations contracting directly with mines
✅ Yes — long-term offtake, prepayment, exchange bypass
Debt/GDP pre-crisis (U.S.) ≈ 120 %+
National debt pre-crisis (U.S.) Jan 2026: ≈ $35–36 T
Paper-market stabilization note
Paper markets are being stabilized with liquidity
While physical silver clears at higher off-exchange prices
Key similarity
Paper control fails when delivery matters
Key difference
Harder to stop (multi-jurisdictional, state-level controls + fiscal limits)
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